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An Introduction to 




La vera interpretazione e quella che si 
consegue ai limiti de/la 
comprensibilita.-L. Pareyson 
This introductory critical assessment of Luigi Pareyson' s 
thought, being part of a larger project, 1 is to be understood bearing 
the following three perspectives in mind. First, within the horizon 
of the theory-method relation. Second, in terms of a referential 
hermeneutic yardstick which will serve as an external, "empirical 
control," or better yet, a screen upon which to trace the movements 
of about ten conditions to be met. And third, in view of a still-in-
progress idea of interpretation as diaphoristics. 
Concerning the first parameter, we are provisionally going 
to assume that interpretation is constituted and activated by a 
grounding dialectic between the requirements of epistemology, 
which underlie and legitimate methodic process, and those of 
ontology, which are inherent in theory. Otherwise stated, one 
cannot use or apply a critical method without at the same time 
positing a referential ontology, whether explicitly or tacitly; vice 
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versa, one cannot theorize about any object or phenomenon, be 
it Picasso's Guernica, the university system or Kafka's texts, with-
out resorting to certain systematic, organizational "moves," in 
other words, without doing it methodically. This will explain, I 
hope, my emphasis on specific key terms and tenets of Pareyson's 
thought, instead of others which, though important enough to 
warrant other perspectives, need not occupy us here. 2 
The second parameter for our reading is constituted by certain 
more or less established principles of hermeneutics as derived 
primarily from the tradition that leads into, and is systematized 
by, the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. A makeshift compendium 
of Gadamer's thought-which is at the same time sensitive to the 
conceptual innovations brought about by Schleiermacher, Hegel, 
Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger 3-would give us the following 
decalogue: 
Interpretation is, intrinsically, historical, linguistic, dialectic, ontolog-
ical, the event of being, objective, begins with the text, exists within the 
present of the interpreter, is a disclosing of truth, and, finally, interpre-
tation is the locus where the aesthetic has been absorbed by or transformed 
into the genuinely hermeneutic. 4 
The specific range and depth of each of these terms will become 
evident through this reading and in the conclusions. 
The critical metaphor of the Diaphora derives from another 
context, one in which poetry and philosophy are not conceived 
as being in opposition to each other, or in radical, mutually exclu-
sive antithesis, but, rather, as necessarily co-originary and thus 
constantly con-versing. The interpretation of the text comes into 
existence when it enters this field, initiating a dialogue with several 
voices, a mise-en-scene which might be, but does not have to be a 
mise-en-abyme, a speaking, we might say, with several possible 
differentiated characters. 5 
2. AESTHETICS 
First published in 1954 after studies on existentialism, Jaspers 
and German idealism, 6 Luigi Pareyson's Estetica: teoria della for-
mativita is the third and last (after Croce's and Gentile's) of the 
great books on aesthetics written in this century in Italy, coming 
out at a time when this genre seemed to have outlived its reason 
to be.7 The importance of this work rests on its being the first, at 
least in the Italian panorama, to deal with the being of the interpreter 
and the being of art, setting them in relation by means of interpre-
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tation itself, and describing the process in ontological terms. The 
key term in Pareyson is Forma in its dynamic, interacting sense. 
As such Forma is, at any one time, either forma formante-form as 
an enabling process which gives a specific shape to whatever it 
is dealing with-or forma formata-form as what something 
exhibits when at rest, what makes it recognizable as such. 
Pareyson anchors his vision in the heart of human existence, 
believing that humankind in its broadest sense is essentially a 
producer of forms (Estetica 19-23 et passim). Thus Forma exists" as 
an organism living of its own life and inner legitimation, closed 
and open both within the definiteness that encloses the infinite" 
[come organismo vivente di propria vita e legalita interna, conclusa ed 
aperta insieme nella sua definitezza che racchiude l'infinito]. 
From these premises, art is described by means of a 
phenomenology of its realization or "coming into being" [nel suo 
farsi]. Here we discover that art is both production and invention, 
which means that in effect art is a making which invents its own 
manner or way of doing, realizing itself as a series of attempts 
toward a successful or fulfilled completion [tentativi verso la rius-
cita]. One cannot produce art without inventing the means to 
"make" it, but, by the same token, one does not invent anything 
unless it is also produced, made real. The underlying principle is 
called forming-activity [formativita, literally 'formativity'], 8 which 
assumes a content, a material means and an inner working law 
peculiar and specific to it (E 22-27). Among the preliminary find-
ings of this position is that, above all, art is conscious of and 
respects the alterity of the work, "protecting" it so to speak from 
blind insight or misguided appropriation. Later, the same concern 
with alterity will mark interpretation in general. 
3. ART 
If, as Pareyson holds, art is a forming-activity both specific 
and intentional, then the question arises: How do we distinguish 
it from the rest of experience, if our entire existence is dependent 
upon this forming capacity? 
First point: Art has no pre-established end-that is, it is not a 
forming-activity-of anything in particular, but form which aims at 
becoming Form, and that's all. Notice how this sounds very much 
like what was postulated by such diverse and indeed strange 
bedfellows as Benedetto Croce and Gertrude Stein. But this ought 
not to be seen as a contradiction or inconsistency as much as the 
fullest exploitation of what both the Idealistic tradition and the 
DIFFERENT/A 220 
Idealism of all theorizing done by artists in general have yielded 
as unshakable premises of cultural humankind: every person is 
an idealist at one time or another; moreover, let's not forget that 
idealist/idealism contains the root notion of idea, eidos, vision. 
However, we will also see radical divergencies among these posi-
tions once we explore other aspects. For instance, Pareyson says 
that thinking and ethics, though subordinated to the "formation 
principle," interact with it, so that the forming-activity [formativita] 
is directed at a given action or phenomenon by taking into consid-
eration thought-i.e., that which thought has formulated-while 
at the same time respecting its alterity. This argument rests on 
the fundamental ontology of the persona, or person, which in 
Pareyson embodies the opening or disclosedness as the coinci-
dence of self-relation and hetero-relation. Person, in short, can 
be thought of as the recognition of alterity, and is therefore emi-
nently social, interpersonal. It can be seen that the argument is 
pointing toward a dialogics of sorts. But to defer this discussion, 
it should also be clear that art may-it doesn't have to-incorporate 
the contribution of thought (of ethics, ideology, politics), without 
sacrificing its primary ideal, which is to become Form. 9 This will 
be crucial to criticism, as we will see further down. 
On the other hand, even in terms of action guided by what 
sounds like a very pragmatic telos-whether it regards shaping 
an idea, or a simple constructive gesture, or even just going 
through the rituals of everydayness handed down through his-
tory-people always try to do things "aesthetically." In the original 
Italian, Pareyson relies on the idiomatic expression fare le case ad 
arte, literally "to make things as if they were a work of art," better 
yet, "to do it right," or according to the inner necessity to do 
things well, perfectly and beautifully. In art there's a shaping-
activity which seeks the Forming process itself : though each and 
every human action is forming-activity [formativita], the work qua 
work of art is Formation [formazione], "in the sense that the work 
intentionally aims at Formation, and thought and action intervene 
only in order to insure that it reaches it" (E 23). 
The work of art is also intrinsically matter/substance, in Italian 
materia, a concrete entity that denies the genitive to art insofar as 
it must evidence itself as pure form. As such, the material aspect 
of the work sets up a polarity with respect to the shaping principle 
of the artistic process, which is identified as puro tentare, pure 
groping and attempting. 10 This calls to mind another vector, the 
pull of interpretive dynamics, the seeking of a path guided by a 
Form which is not yet there (and is, therefore, unknown, ungrasp-
able, invisible so to speak) and must, therefore, be guessed or 
divined: 
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The divination of form is thus only a law guiding the execution in 
progress, a law that cannot be explicated in terms of precepts, but 
rather, as an inner norm of the action aiming at its successful 
completion [alla riuscita]; thus it is not a single law valid for all 
artistic cases, but a rule which is immanent to the one specific 
process in question. (E 75) 
For Pareyson this is consistent with the traditional notion of art 
as a making, admitting both techne and poiein, as well as with the 
more (historically) recent idea of lo stile e l'uomo, Buffon's "the 
style is the man," a very fortunate ideologeme crucial to the un-
derstanding of Modern, especially post-Romantic, aesthetics. In 
fact, in Pareyson's universe one finds Goethe, Poe, Schelling, 
Fichte, Bergson, Valery, Dewey.11 It is worth remarking on how 
Pareyson interprets Kant's aesthetics of disinterested and de-
tached contemplation. Pareyson "extracts" from the "Analytic of 
the Sublime" materials to integrate into his notion of person: 
The sublime is therefore the only instance, in Kant's aesthetics, of 
an aesthetic judgment which is truly and properly expression of a 
feeling [sentimento ], in the sense that it offers to this feeling a sensible 
figuration. It is a contemplation which is expression, that is, not 
only recognition, but an active attribution of spiritual senses: it is 
the transfiguration of reality as figuration of a feeling [sentimento]. 
(EK 135) 
Further down, the very description/interpretation of the sublime 
is predisposed to an existential, dialogic, inter-personal dynamics: 
If the beautiful is the object of a judgment of taste, the sublime 
"comes from a spiritual sentiment"; if the beautiful concerns a 
relationship between subject and object in which the active role is 
played somehow by the latter, in predisposing itself to the exigen-
cies of the former, the sublime instead concerns the relationship 
of subject and object in which the active role is played by the 
subject, which transfers unto the object its inner feeling [interno 
sentimento]. If the contemplation of the beautiful is a calm recogniz-
ing, the contemplation of the sublime is an emotionally charged 
attributing of spiritual meanings to nature [la contemplazione del 
sublime e un commosso rivestire di sensi spirituali la natura]. (EK 136) 
In either case it can be seen how his theory of art is at once 
antithetical to Kant's, as we saw above when he states that art 
has no purpose, and yet a "development" of some deeply buried 
premises of the Third Critique. Contrary to what Gadamer does, 
which is to cdtique the aesthetic consciousness as a sort of aliena-
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tion, as "differentiation" with respect to reality and finally for its 
abstract dogmatism which prevented the understanding of art as 
also (if not primarily) "a mode of self-understanding" (Truth and 
Method 86), Pareyson retrieves the "conscious act" of the experi-
ence of the sublime and the beautiful and underscores the found-
ing necessary aspect which is related to the forming activity of 
the person: receptivity, in short, is an activity, and insofar as it 
is a doing, it is poiein, it is a producer of forms, of discourse we 
might say. Ergo the aesthetic experience is intrinsically related to 
the interpretive one, which is characterized as dialectic-produc-
tive.12 His aesthetic is finally anchored to the three notions of 
Production, Interaction, and Forming-activity. 
4. THE ONTOLOGY 
If everything in life and, therefore, in understanding depends 
upon this formative process, the notion of making, of fare, assumes 
paramount relevance and must be examined closely. For the Italian 
philosopher, any given action is the specification and the instanc-
ing of one activity which is at the same time the concentration of 
all other possible activities. More than that, we form things by 
"making" and by "inventing" the way things can be made: 
l' artista deve fare cio che non esiste ancora, e quindi deve inventare 
eseguendo, mentre il lettore deve cogliere cio che esiste gia e quindi 
deve eseguire riconoscendo. (E 249) 
[The artist must make what does not yet exist, and must, therefore 
invent while executing, whereas the reader must gather [also: grasp; 
perceive] what exists already, therefore, execute while recognizing.] 
The proper evaluation both of the difference and the distinc-
tion between artist and reader has always been a problematical 
point in interpretation theory. We must remember that, especially 
in the wake of "committed" art ( or art specifically intended for a 
particular end, message or effect), the re-establishment of a boun-
dary between art as totally free and preoccupied solely with Pure 
Form, and reading (=criticism) as bound and committed to an 
extra-aesthetic task, has basically given legitimacy to the epis-
temological approach to art and interpretation, and has indeed 
contributed to that artistic "alienation" which characterizes the 
Modern period. There are, however, several places in the Estetica 
where from the point of view of understanding, there is no distinc-
tion between artist and critic, it being simply a question of position 
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or emphasis: the artist will strive toward the realization of Pure 
Form, the reader toward the comprehension of the same. Yet the 
underlying ontology is the same, suggesting a difference of degree 
rather than of kind. Nevertheless, to return to the text, we begin 
to see, for instance, that the possibilities open to the work of art 
are infinite because it rests upon what Pareyson in a later work-
Verita e Interpretazione, 1972-calls the ontology of the inexhaustible 
[ ontologia dell' inesauribile]: 
non il nulla, ma l' essere, non l' assenza ma la ridondanza ... non 
l' Abgrund ma l' Urgrund (VI 40) 
[Not nothingness, but being, not absence but redundance ... not 
the Abgrund but the Urgrund] 
This is an important consideration in light of the fact that 
Pareyson' s thought is also typically interpreted, especially for its 
more existentialist traits, as already on the way toward the post-
metaphysical, in that it stresses the Abgrund ( or the Un-grund) of 
being in close connection with what he elsewhere terms the "on-
tology of freedom." Yet the very possibility of an ongoing (i.e., 
historical) thinking of being whose relationship to existence is 
marked by endless revelations [rivelazioni] about a reality which, 
no matter how defined, is "gratuitous" [gratuita], must speak the 
language of events that have already taken place, what in other 
philosophies are called monuments, tradition, the collective un-
conscious. This is an open door to the discourse on myth, the 
arche and origin . The ontology is inexhaustible because the monu-
ments, the traces, the memories are endless, because there has 
always been an Urgrund. The constructions (the hypotheses, the 
wars, the revolutions and the archives) which we cast and haul 
about reality suspended between necessity and possibility do indeed 
expose their weak side to a possible "anthropomorphism," 13 but 
they also allow us to retrieve those forms which, though no longer 
believed universal, did however embody an attempt or express a 
will to some notion of universality or totality at various points in 
our history. These are, have been, effective history. As such, though 
Pareyson has made an almost categorical distinction between 
mythical and rational discourse, 14 what is here suggested is that 
the notion of Urgrund does not have to be automatically read as 
a teleological, absolute (perhaps "Hegelian") and foundational 
gesture, because the telos here can be delimited, circumscribed, 
localized and personalized, consistent with Pareyson's thoughts on 
the experience of art, which, as we saw above, does yet have 
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some sort of (no matter how "special") end, without having to 
make claims for all Art. I think this disclosure, this openness in 
Pareyson' s overall philosophy can be useful if we want to regain 
an idea of history and of symbolic and figural signification which, 
in the wake and under the influence of Heidegger, Derrida and 
Benjamin, is not bound exclusively to the predominance of the 
ontological difference or event, the trace or the monument. 
Perhaps what is important to bear in mind is the problem of reality 
and the responsibility of the single individual, issues which exis-
tentialism treated in depth but these days are too often dismissed 
or simply forgotten. Man is always a person [persona], which leads 
the philosopher to assert that no philosophy is plausible which is 
not above all a "philosophy of the person," where both the subjective 
and objective genitive obtain. The discourse thus far rests upon 
these premises: 
anzitutto il principio per cui ogni operare umano e sempre insieme 
ricettivita e attivita, e in secondo luogo il principio per cui ogni operare 
umano e sempre personale. (E 180) 
[Above all [is] the principle according to which every human doing 
is always both receptivity and activity, and secondly according to the 
principle whereby every human doing is always personal. ]15 
On the same page we read that: 
Io devo si agire e decidere, ma anche non posso non decidere: v'e, nella 
rnia liberta, nella liberta ch'io sono a me stesso, una necessita iniziale, 
ch'e il segno del rnio esser principiato, del rnio lirnite, della rnia 
finitezza, d'una ricettivita iniziale e costitutiva per cui io sono dato a 
me stesso e la rnia iniziativa e data a se stessa. (ibid.) 
[I must indeed act and decide, but also: I cannot not decide: there is, 
in the freedom I have with respect to myself, an initial necessity-
which is the sign of my being principled, of my limits, and of my 
finitude-a necessity for an initial and constitutive receptivity so that 
I may be given over to myself and my initiative is given over to itself.] 
In the same context the philosopher says in fact that "the form 
itself of receptivity is an activity," though human making/doing 
[operare] in not, initially, creative . To accept the dialectic of 
stimulus-response does not mean subscribing to deterministic 
passivity, but rather that the dyad receptivity-activity is always 
active, connective and developing according to other intentional 
premises. 
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5. KNOWLEDGE AND INTERPRETATION 
Perceptive knowledge [conoscenza sensibile] can grasp reality only 
insofar as it is marked by prefiguration, therefore, only insofar as 
it can "produce and form" an image, "more to the point, an image 
so well executed [riuscita] that it reveal, better, that it be the thing 
itself" [un'immagine cosi ben riuscita che riveli anzi sia la cosa stessa]. 
In other words, the intention to capture or penetrate the item in 
question implies, solicits and even exacts the productivity which 
will literally figure out the image. 
As a result, human knowledge in general has an intrinsic 
interpretive character. Interpretation, says the philosopher, 
is a type of knowledge exquisitely active and personal: its active 
nature explains its productive and formative character, and its per-
sonal nature explains how it is essentially movement, restlessness, 
a search for syntony or resonance, in sum, endless figuration. (E 
179-80; my emphasis) 
One can see how at this particular juncture Pareyson's position 
comes very close to some recent readings of both Freud and 
Nietzsche as the thinkers of interminable analysis or interpreta-
tion. Moreover, coming from a totally different background, 16 by 
underscoring figuration, his theory is proleptically in tune with 
our postmodern hermeneutics. We will return to these consider-
ations further down. 
At this point we have established that interpretation is based 
upon the person, which coincides with the knowing being, the 
forming being, whereas the work (opera in the Italian, not a minor 
detail, suggesting process, temporality, indeed "working") is what 
is known, what is already formed. Interpretation then is formante 
or "forming," the work is formata or "formed." Said metaphori-
cally, interpretation is "a seeing which lets itself be regarded, and 
a regarding that aims at seeing ... a hearing which lets itself be 
listened to, and a listening that means to be heard" [un vedere che 
si fa guardare, e un guardare che mira al vedere ... l'udire che si fa 
ascoltare e l'ascoltare che vuol farsi udire]. 
In order to reduce the risk of stray or biased interpretation, 
it is important that interpretation be sensitive to the question(s) 
raised by the object or the work in question and that, moreover, 
it organize itself in such a way as to be able to construct freely, 
"developing and elaborating, opening up and revealing the inter-
pretand itself" [sviluppando e svolgendo, cioe interrogando, aprendo e 
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rivelando l'interpretrando]. Thus, without forgetting the person who 
does the interpreting, the person who, in giving account, is con-
stantly trying to confer a meaning or portray a sense, we are also 
attuned to the possibilities of constant figuration which the inter-
preting act elicits and thinking imagines. 
Now this notion of interpretation as tightly connected to the 
idea of persona is more fully developed in Pareyson' s abovemen-
tioned later work entitled Verita e Interpretazione. Here we find 
another crucial term, pensiero rivelativo, which we can literally re-
nder as "revealing thought." According to Pareyson, the distinct 
notions of saying, revealing and expressing coincide: 
that the word is revealing is a sign of the validity of a thought 
which is intrinsically speculative yet not oblivious to being, and 
that the word is expressive is a sign of the historical concreteness 
of a thought that has not forgotten time. (VI 23) 
On the basis of the foregoing sketch of the basic tenets, it can 
be intuited that the Italian philosopher is moving cautiously 
among many of his contemporaries, but there is doubt that he is 
here also staking out his own theoretical horizon. If historiographic 
triangulations are at all useful, we can suppose that the way 
Heidegger was reacting to the idealist strain in Husserl and the 
Marburg neokantians, Pareyson was reacting to Croce and Gen-
tile's idealism as well as to Banfi's transcendental phenomenology, 
which had come on the Italian scene in the late twenties. 17 
Pareyson seems to be introducing an ontological perspective 
which is reconceptualized in terms of being and time in order to 
supplant historicist thought (but I suspect also the notion of the 
historical in the strictly Enlightenment and then positivist sense), 
a stance which is critical of instrumentalism, culturalism, bio-
grafism and all those historicist aporias which reduce everything 
to the immanence of a given historical situation, or to an idealized 
pragmaticism. 
Yet a thinking which is also a revealing cannot circumvent 
the issue as well as the reality of history and expression because 
of truth no evidence can be adduced except through history, 
through society, through the discourses made for or by history. 
In this sense, in view of its being intrinsically "personal," interpre-
tation must of necessity be also historically and linguistically un-
derstood. With these requirements, what counts is not reason, 
but truth, because reason without truth yields the irrational, and 
reason can be only either technical or historical. This subtle way 
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of dealing with history may be worth pondering further: it is truth, 
says the philosopher, that grounds [radica] reason, because: 
anche gli aspetti piu 'teoretici' quali l'interesse puramente culturale 
della storia delle idee o il rigore strettamente scientifico delle 
ricerche metodologiche, non resistono a una radicalizzazione che 
Ii spinge inevitabilmente all'esito irrazionalistico d'uno storicismo 
integrale e d'un esplicito prassismo (VI 24) 
[even the most 'theoretical' aspects such as the purely cultural 
interests of the history of ideas or the strictly scientific rigor of 
methodological research, cannot resist the radicalization that 
pushes them inevitably toward the irrational consequences of an 
integral historicism and an explicit praxism.] 
Truth instead is equated with being. Being, says Pareyson, is not 
a value, otherwise it would be subordinated to the values insti-
tuted by mankind, and would tend to classify itself as either lasting 
or provisional. Rather, 
L' essere non ha nessun motivo per preferire il durevole al momen-
taneo .... Il problema e di riconoscere nella storia la presenza dell' essere, 
e quindi di distinguere in cio che e tutto egualmente storico ed espres-
sivo del proprio tempo: fra cio ch' e solamente storico ed espressivo 
e cio ch'e anche ontologico e rivelativo, fra cio la cui natura e il cui 
valore si esauriscono nella storicita, e cio la cui storicita e apertura 
e tramite dell' essere, e quindi sede della sua apparizione. (ibid. 42) 
[Being has no particular reason to prefer what lasts to what is 
momentary .... The problem is to recognize the presence of being in 
history, and, therefore, to distinguish in that which exists what is 
equally historical and expressive in one's time: between that which 
is only historical and expressive, whose nature and whose value 
are exhausted in historicity, and that whose historicity is disclosure 
and medium of being and thus locus of its apparition. (first em-
phasis is mine)] 
In short, no evidence of being can be given which is not at the 
same time historically configured: being does-must-appear in 
history. The abovementioned notion of ontological inexhaustibil-
ity is now given body and contour: the interpreting person will 
insist on both the co-presencing in time of a historical and revealing 
act, as well as the experience of the open-ended discourse ever 
in proximity to other possible "figural" formations. 
In this context, another key notion in Pareyson's thought is 
Tradition, which already in the 1954 Estetica was conceived as 
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existing within the work of art. Tradition is crucial because it 
supplies the plenum between the interpreter and the work within 
which interpretation can be configured. The interpretand's posi-
tion within this slippery, groundless, apparently elusive critical 
horizon required, in the earlier book, that in approaching the 
concrete work, the artifact, we had to be exposed to at least three 
concerns: the school or current which nourished the work, its 
living reality (its socio-historical instancing, we might say), and 
"the original result of the working interpretation which the work 
itself yields up" [il risultato originale dell'interpretazione operante 
ch'essa ne da], which is to say the spontaneous claim made by the 
work with respect to how it wishes ( or exacts) to be understood. 18 
Again we have an operative trilateral cognitive model which the 
work elicits upon the interpreter's approaching it, disclosing an 
enabling capacity, we might even say the agency to spur a dialogue 
with whoever comes into contact with it. 
It may be opportune to recall that this rooting of tradition in 
the work itself is not peculiar to Pareyson' s work. In fact, it is not 
foreign to literary hermeneutics as elaborated, in their different 
ways, by both Gadamer and Peter Szondi, according to whom, 
and with particular reference to biblical exegesis, the history of a 
text is also the (hi)story of its interpretations. In particular, 
Gadamer's notion of tradition as Ueberlieferung, or trans-mission, 
is also not too distant conceptually from Pareyson's. It is signifi-
cant, finally, that Gadamer and Pareyson both are behind (and 
seem to come together in) Vattimo's notion of Verwindung, 
wherein tradition is understood as a necessarily twisted and dis-
torting appropriation of what precedes, never an overcoming, or 
Ueberwindung.19 
Yet there are traits which are specifically Pareyson' s and can 
be very suggestive for future analyses, especially from what is 
left of the left. Tradition is to be distinguished above all from the 
notion of Revolution (today this is anachronistic, but, again, let's 
not forget what were the "timely" issues in the wake of World 
War II). Tradition, we learn, is the exact opposite of revolution, 
not because it counterfoists to it some variant of conservation, but 
because revolution means to start all over at the beginning, which 
means its object is the past (an invented pure past projected into 
an unlikely future), whereas tradition (and interpretation through, 
indeed as, tra-dition) is the regeneration of an ontological neces-
sity, it aims at recapturing the origin and its object is being. We 
can infer that interpretation, and the notion of tradition it es-
pouses, is, therefore, never utopistic, dreamy or nostalgic (in the 
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sense in which these three words have something incoherent and 
dismissable about them). Interpretation is, on the contrary, topical, 
desired, at worst melancholic, though this latter only signals its being 
sense-oriented (or "sensitive"), a type or way of knowing neverthe-
less-at best a work of art itself. 20 
Before we make our way toward an overall retrospective pic-
ture of Pareyson's theory of interpretation, we must recall three 
more points. First, that interpretation in its active verbal accepta-
tion, as interpreting [interpretare], is always a transcending process. 
Second, that the notion of originality-novelty of the person and 
of time, the "new" of the avant-gardes and Modernism, we might 
add-is the same as the notion of being originary-as derived 
from the primordial ontological rapport, which is constitutively 
"originating." Therefore, to be original is to be originary, and the 
originary is always original. In a post-Derridian epoch, we can 
see how this is important. And third, that 
Interpretation is that form of knowledge which is at once and in-
separably historical and truthful [veritativa], ontological and per-
sonal, revealing and expressive. (VI 53) 
[l'interpretazione e quella forma della conoscenza che e insieme e 
inseparabilmente veritativa e storica, ontologica e personale, 
rivelativa ed espressiva.] 
The implications of this for critics of art and culture: when 
approaching a text, comprehension is possible only insofar as the 
text reveals itself, but this revealing in turn needs the other (that 
is, the interpreting persona) in order to be expressed: to listen 
(look, sense) and to speak are inseparable: interpretation is not a 
game of silence, but the speaking that issues from the silence that 
enwraps the artwork. The fact that the revealing of the artifact 
and the speaking of the interpreter go inextricably together or, 
said otherwise, that interpretation is always a critique of some-
thing or other, brings us to yet another fine point in Pareyson's 
thought, one that has sweeping consequences for the "practical" 
aspect of criticism and commentary. When interpreting, says the 
philosopher, we are not striving for analysis, but rather for synthe-
sis. This may trigger an alert signal, for it does resonate with 
similar idealist and historicist versions (like Croce's, for instance-
and we don't need "impressionist" criticism-), yet it also beckons 
to Heidegger's "hearing the call of the poetical." In fact, by 
minimizing the obsessive preoccupation with objectivity-the in-
terpreter does not, cannot, "objectify" him/herself, nor can the 
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work of art itself ever be thought of as being only an "object"-it 
also avoids the relativism of methodologism, as well as any arbi-
trariness and all skepticism. In this fashion, hermeneutics turns 
away from the constraints and the aporias of epistemology and 
is open to the possibilities of ontology, an eminently linguistic, 
"narrative" perspective. 
What is open to the interpreter are the historical concretions 
of being as they manifest themselves in specific events and by 
and large in cultural phenomena. What for many thinkers is 
sought as the unity in variety or the multiplicity of truth is, accord-
ing to Pareyson, a false dilemma, because these different formu-
lations do not exist in history, as if they were contents dropped 
into the abstract river of time; rather, they are history, so that each 
interpretation of these problems is but a singular exegetical concre-
tion, which is as plausible as, and not exclusive of, many others 
that have actually come into being. The same can thus be said of 
the many and varied interpretations of works of art. This is par-
ticularly evident in the case of artworks that necessarily dilate the 
notion of interpretation, like drama and musical scores; these 
artistic phenomena are in fact interpreted each and every time 
they are performed [ eseguiti]. The artwork does not disappear 
amidst the multiplicity of interpretive reappraisals [esecuzioni], but 
remains true to itself even in the act of disclosing its being to the 
interpreter: 
Le esecuzioni, al pari delle interpretazioni, sono sempre nuove, 
non mirano ad essere uniche e esemplari e totalizzanti, ma parlano 
a tutti nella maniera in cui ciascuno sa meglio intenderle. (VI 67) 
[Much like interpretations, performances are always new; they do not 
aim at being unique and exemplary and totalizing, rather, they speak 
to all in the manner in which each one knows how to understand 
them.] 
This position, already elaborated in part in Estetica 226-47, can be 
compared with Benjamin's reflection on the reproducibility of the 
work of art: the aura may be gone, but the problem of interpreting/ 
performing postmodern art forms persists, and with a different 
agenda. 
6. DEVELOPING THE CONSEQUENCES 
We can see now that the interpreter is not a "subject" that 
dissolves into the work, or, vice versa, that absorbs and dissolves 
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the work in its interpreting act. The interpreter does not have to 
"depersonalize" itself in a vain-and unneeded---effort to be 
"true" and "distanced" from the artwork. For the interpreter is 
primarily a person, open and ever ready to disclose itself to other(s). 
In tune with this premise, the work is never an "object" which 
ought to be "represented" externally: the work is finally charac-
terized by an intrinsic "unobjectifiability" [inoggettivibilita] which 
derives from its needing to be activated, realized or performed 
(in the sense of esecuzione, mise-en-scene)-and reading dso, 
according to Pareyson, is performing 21-and which cannot be re-
duced to any one of its performances or realizations. 
What this entails, in more broad hermeneutic terms, is an 
authentic "overcoming of the subject" that in turns neutralizes 
the subjectivistic attitude toward interpretation-which is present 
in both scientific and phenomenological thought-with its ten-
dency to universalize the impersonal and placing it as the found-
ation of thought itself. With the notion of person as derived from 
Pareyson, on the other hand, we are co-involved in the irreducible 
distance of the artwork, but at the same time we rely on its unique 
and singular historical substance. And going against Kantian 
claims of impersonality, the disclosure of the text is radically per-
sonal, avoiding thus abstractions and theoretical relativisms of all 
sorts. Before the artwork, we must listen, 
because truth is not something that man invents or produces, or 
that can be invented or produced in any fashion; one must let truth 
be without pretending to invent it; and if the person becomes the 
means of its revelation, this is above all in order to be the locus of its 
occurrence [sede del suo avvento]. (VI 84)22 
In sum, truth can issue solely from within one of its formulations, 
"with which each time it identifies itself, and within which it 
resides always as something inexhaustible." On the other side of 
methodologism and its epistemological legitimations, interpreta-
tion aspires toward pure theory without ever becoming Theory, 
and yet theoretical it must remain, that is, a contemplative dis-
course which inscribes situations and topics, and can therefore 
serve as a principle of valid cultural transformations. 
7. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS 
If we return to our initial frames of reference, we find that 
Pareyson' s thought confirms and expands our hermeneutic 
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model. To begin with, in terms of the theory-method relation, or 
the equiprimordial, co-founding dialectic between method as 
praxiological, instrumental means of knowledge gathering, and 
theory as the rhetorical postulate of a world-view or legitimizing 
ontology, Pareyson leans toward the latter without entirely dis-
sociating himself from the former. That he emphasizes theory 
above method is to be understood in part in terms of what was 
then, right after World War II, a historical and contextual necessity 
to realign scientific, rationalistic and phenomenological methods 
of inquiry; yet it can be argued that, volens nolens, he himself 
deploys a loosely adapted but no less rigorous phenomenology. 
In effect, the path in between-the meta-hodos-artwork and in-
terpreter cannot even be described without a logos which is at the 
same time (true to the several meanings that, etymologically, it 
embodies) the revealing word and the temporally determined, 
discoursive inscription of the interpreting act itself. Elaborating 
on the metaphors suggested by the respective etymologies of 
method (pathway between two or more loci) and theory (light in 
the clearing, overall vision), then we can say that with Pareyson 
interpretation entails no longer a formulaic and alienating relation 
between theories and methods ready to hand, but a temporal-exis-
tential vicissitude of walking (toward) and seeing (while being 
seen) at the same time the potential disclosure of the artwork ( of 
reality, in broad terms). The implications outside the here 
thematized field of (literary and artistic) interpretation are that, 
with his notions of forming-activity and person, Pareyson dis-
closes the aesthetic to the ethic, and in the end the social, and 
can thus lead us onward to a general theory of being in the world. 23 
Concerning the second frame of reference sketched out at the 
beginning of this paper-namely, that there are at least ten con-
ditions to be met for any interpretive discourse to be called her-
meneutical-it seems evident that with Pareyson we can really 
speak of a hermeneutic experience as constitutive of the human 
dimension in its totality: life is an endless shaping and forming, 
and interpretation is the highest and most self-conscious, reflective 
type of shaping (for both the artist and the critic). We can go 
through each of the requirements of our makeshift decalogue and 
find that, for Pareyson, interpretation is: 
1. Intrinsically historical: being, truth and the work of art 
itself are, as we saw above, essentially historical notions, even 
though they may not be identified with history tout court, and 
retain yet an ideal constitution. 
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2. Intrinsically linguistic: any formulation about an artifact 
comes into being primarily as a linguistic formulation: listening 
to the speaking of the revealing work means responding with a 
theoretical-Le., "rhetorical" -formulation. 
3. Dialectic: in its broadest, unthematized sense, there is no 
doubt that the several interconnections that refer to one another 
constantly require an enabling dialectic; moreover, the relation 
between presence and the given, time and being, listening and 
speaking are possible only as dialogue (we may think here of the 
common etymon of dialectic and dialogue). These themes are 
developed in Pareyson' s work on German idealism. 
4. Ontologic: it is so by definition; as we saw during the 
course of our exposition, to interpret means to engage in a continu-
ous recalling and recovery of being as it manifested itself in histor-
ical concretions and in artworks in particular, each and every time 
aspiring to an ever elusive fullness of being. The ontologic here 
stands for the interface between what metaphysics has said being 
is, as well as what it concealed in the transmission of the givenness 
of untold concrete beings. 
5. The work and the interpreter are together the site of the 
occurrence of being: being is not created artificiously, demanding 
rather that the interpreter/artist stay in wait "listening" until the 
unconcealing "happens," "alights." 
6. Objective: in the sense in which it is not "subjective" as 
understood by our post-cartesian mind set; more than that, how-
ever, objective here stands for the recognition (against idealist 
claims) that the artwork must "exist" in concreto, as a tangible, 
verifiable "something" an artist (or anyone) has actually made or 
produced. 
7. Begins with the text: there's no idolatry of the text as we 
have come to know it after Lacan and Derrida; rather, text is both 
the entity and the metaphor for the actual artwork, and it includes 
the canvas as well as the stage representation, the statue as well 
as the manuscript. Much of this can be inferred from the long 
section Pareyson devotes to "reading" in the Estetica. 
8. Understands what is being said in light of the present: no 
pseudo anti-metaphysics of "presence" here, for the present is 
the historical actualitas of the interpreter. Interpretation is 
grounded in the unrepeatable, irreplacable experience of the per-
son, and the interpreting act comprehends primarily in view of 
its present. Despite thematic, geographic and chronological dis-
tances, the interpreting act discloses the temporality of its being 
as such-and-such in a precise given moment, which is the "time 
of its occurrence." 
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9. Broaching the boundaries of the distinguishable, interpre-
tation is---cannot but be-truth, critical, necessary, midway be-
tween theory and practice, recalcitrant to ideology, the string from 
which pends the fate of existence and liberty. 
10. It can be argued that Pareyson would want hermeneutics 
to be subsumed to aesthetics, yet it cannot be denied that the 
primacy placed on the person, on the act of interpreting and on 
the necessity of the other (vis-a-vis the artwork) can also lead one 
to see the two poles, aesthetics and hermeneutics, as the recto 
and verso of the same inscription. Moreover, the fact that such a 
premium value is placed upon the "forming ability" of all experi-
ence, may lend credence to the claim, made later by Gadamer, 
that indeed aesthetics must be understood as simply one (though 
privileged) dimension of the hermeneutic experience. 
8. OTHER IMPLICATIONS 
What are some practical consequences for literary theory? 
Some suggestions are offered by the philosopher himself. The 
problem of "content" is not essential-which is not to say it isn't 
important. Rather, the critic should be aware that themes, sub-
jects, arguments, and so on are subsumed to the more radical 
question of style, which is an ontologically determining factor 
insofar as it constitutes, in non-Pareysonian terms, the "signature" 
of the artist. This points up to the rhetorical import of the concreti-
zation of the work, it being understood that rhetoric is not mere 
tropology or stylistics, but the locus of linguistic occurrence, the 
middle ground between langue and langage, the hermeneutic dis-
cipline of topics. 24 Pareyson writes that we can have art without 
theme or content-accepting the diverse manifestations of the 
twentieth century-Le., the avant-gardes, which Croce, Lukacs 
and others couldn't stand and wouldn't deign to remark on-but 
there is no artwork qua artwork without a distinctive style. 
A second important contribution which stems from this her-
meneutic is that poetics are extremely important. Here we should 
open up a long digressive paragraph on the several meanings of 
the word "poetics." Suffice it to say that poetics is something 
different from what the structuralists have theorized over the past 
quarter of a century or so. In this context, poetics correspond to 
what artists say about art in general and their own work in particu-
lar. It should not be confused with aesthetics, which is normative 
(E 311-13) and speculative (316-18). Poetics is programmatic, prag-
matic, it aspires to a totality which is such only and exclusively 
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for that one particular artist and often for the execution of one 
particular work: 
that the artist represent or transfigure, the essential thing is that 
he "figures"; whether he deforms or transforms, the important 
thing is that he "forms." It is necessary that art be informed by a 
poetic which, in its concrete praxis, fuels it and upholds the forma-
tion of the work, but there is no one poetic more essential than 
any other. (E 314) 
Going against what Croce and Binni in Italy and Northrop Frye 
in North America held on this issue (and thus implicitly siding, 
on this argument, with both Anceschi's critical phenomenology 
and Della Volpe's dialectical materialism), Pareyson believes that 
an artist's poetic or poetics are crucial to the proper understanding 
of a given work, if for no other reason than the fact that he/she 
who makes (techne) the artifact, and lives through the creative 
(poiein) process, is certainly capable of saying something about 
what makes the "forming activity" construe a "forma formata," a 
finished and shaped aesthetic product. Moreover, in view of his 
general ontological plan, it makes sense to consider the artist the 
first most original critic of him/herself: the critical-analytical mo-
ment interacts not when he/she is at rest (in which case the artist 
is no different from the plain reader/viewer, and, as we saw above, 
authorial "intentions" are meaningless), but during the process of 
the making, while exercising and realizing all possible thoughts and 
skills toward the accomplishment of the task. 
Almost a direct consequence of this revalorization of the art-
ist's "critical" input, in Pareyson's universe criticism coincides 
with reading, but of a specific kind. Criticism, he writes, 
is a kind of reading during which the aspect of judgment is accen-
tuated; moreover, in order to guarantee the soundness of its evalu-
ations, this reading aims at defining and subsuming a method, so 
that the critic is ultimately methodologically conscious of his own 
judgments. (EA 261) 
Criticism, in short, is always both criticism-of-a-work, and criti-
cism-of-itself, that is, metacriticism. In view also of what we saw 
earlier in our excursus, we can posit a tripartite segmentation of 
interpretation into-and as-theoretical hermeneutics, poetics and 
methodological criticism. Moreover, we discover an exigency to ac-
count for the "included" middle (culled from his reinterpretation 
of the Third Critique) as the kingpin around which the entire pro-
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cess rotates in intelligible equilibrium. Leaving aside for the mo-
ment the nature and structure of judgment, Pareyson immediately 
adds that criticism should not "overtake" or "overcome" the work, 
and ought to think of itself as simultaneously "reading and perfor-
mance or representation" [lettura ed esecuzione]. The third segment, 
or the "methodological" or "judgmental" element, orients criticism 
back to the first, or purely theoretical hermeneutics, coherently 
with his position as described in the earlier parts of this paper. 
We can sum up the "three moments" in a makeshift hermeneutic 
circle: 
POETICS 
(forming in re) 
( divining ante rem 
experience/formativity in re 
aesthetics post rem) 
HERMENEUTICS 
READING/CRITICISM 
(formed post rem) 
Finally, with reference to the above mentioned possibility of 
interpretation as diaphoristics, which claims that interpreting is 
akin to profounding oneself in the murky waters between poetry 
and philosophy, Pareyson's position permits further voyages into 
these uncharted seas. One question which could in fact be explored 
with profit is the notion of Urgrund-as opposed to our more 
familiar, Heidegger-inspired, notion of Abgrund. The latter has 
yielded riveting results ( especially in the investigations of Der-
rida), playing as it does on the missing half of the signifier which 
in logocentric discourse is nevertheless bantered "as if" the sig-
nified were there. But what deconstruction cannot ever lead us 
to explore ( bther than to continually unmask) is the realm of the 
sociohistorical archetype, which could be given renewed (non-
structuralist) vigor through the investigation of the ontological 
Urgrund in figural and allegorical terms. Conversely, given that, 
much like Heidegger, Pareyson also (albeit with a different ter-
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minology, in part inspired by Jaspers) frames the human dimen-
sion as essentially being "thrown into existence," in reason of 
which man's most constitutive trait is then his "forming" drive, 
the notion of an Urgrund could also be developed in terms of the 
necessary "projecting" which both artists and interpreters do con-
stantly. This would reverse the standpoint and lead to the study 
of "prototypes" of all sorts, and conceivably can be useful in 
aesthetics as well as in ethics and politics. The value to our 
diaphoristic ideal is that, after (or at the same time as) the destruc-
tion of metaphysical, totalizing perspectives and constructs, the 
interpreting being finds itself going through discourse forma-
tions-dia-Zogos-positing each and every time-the phoric ele-
ment-a possible inscription or de-piction (again, a temporally 
proleptic, enframing futurity) which partakes of aesthesis as well 
as of thought, of midday as well as midnight. But these conceptual 
schemes will have to be developed elsewhere. 
Notes 
1. This is a chapter from my nearly complete book, provisionally titled 
Thresholds; Italian Literary Criticism and Hermeneutics, 1950-1985. The "Preface" to 
this work has appeared in The Italian Journal, Vol. II, N. 4 (1988): 36-42. Another 
chapter, bearing the title "Repositioning Interpretive Discourse," has been pub-
lished in Differentia 2 (Spring 1988): 83-126. The theoretical matrix is briefly 
sketched out again in the second paragraph of the present essay. 
2. Pareyson's thought can be approached from a number of different areas, 
all of which inevitably reveal his often subterranean influence during the past 
forty years. As the titles of his books alone indicate, he has studied German 
Idealism, Existentialism, the critique of the Italian idealist and historicist 
hegemony, and has written crucial theoretical works on aesthetics, interpretation 
theory, and ethics . His Estetica is the starting point for the apparently unrelated 
positions of the early Eco and Vattimo. For the relationship between interpreta-
tion and ethics, see Alberto Rosso's fine study. 
3. Not to mention Plato and Aristotle, authors all studied in depth by 
Gadamer throughout his career and protagonists in his masterpiece Truth and 
Method. 
4. Each of these conditions can be illustrated with a network of references 
to Gadamer's work, but it would make the present essay too long. I have also 
kept in view the studies on Gadamer's hermeneutics done by Bleicher, Vattimo, 
Palmer, Ripanti, Weinsheimer. 
5. I have developed this perspective in Carravetta 1990, which emphasizes 
the challenge of the rhetoric of Nietzsche, and the problem of interpretation at 
the interfaces bei.ween the Modern and the Postmodern epochs. 
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6. Though we cannot get into extended details here, a reconsideration of 
Pareyson's pre-Estetica writings would be useful to reassess how much his notion 
of persona owes to, and yet is a radicalizing of, German existentialism's emphasis 
on the necessary, on repetition, and French existentialism's stress on the contin-
gent, on choice. See Pareyson 1971:7-110. For his crucial distinction between 
Heidegger's and Jaspers' notion of existenziell! existentiell, see 1971 :207-58, besides 
his book on Jaspers . The various versions of existentialism debated in Italy at 
the onset of World War II can be assessed by looking at representative texts by 
Banfi, Abbagnano, Preti, Paci and Pareyson published in Banfi's quarterly Studi 
Filosofici, anno II (1941), now available in the 1972 Forni reprint, vol. I, 113-206. 
For Croce's scathing reaction to this issue, see Critica, I (1942):48-49. For a ba-
lanced history and theory of Italian existentialism, see Santucci, who attributes 
a major role to Pare yson. For Abbagnano, see his Critical Existentialism. For a 
global reconstruction within the Italain panorama, especially vis-a-vis the 
hegemonic idealist-historicist currents, see the different perspectives of Garin 
and Semerari. 
7. A case may be made for Emilio Betti's Teoria generale dell'interpretazione 
(1955), though its being almost exclusively a treatise on juridical interpretation 
makes it less manageable in the realm of aesthetics and literary criticism. There 
is little echo of Betti's influence outside of jurisprudence and legal history. There-
after, however, no one, with the arguable exception of Brandi's Teoria generale 
della critica (1974) and Eco's Semiotica (1975), has attempted to write a general, 
omnicomprehensive theory of art and interpretation which invests the totality 
of the human being. 
8. The English rendition of these terms is necessarily provisional. It is hoped 
that the awkwardness is offset by the need to distinguish in the pages that 
follow among the various terms rooted in Forma which constellate Pareyson's 
philosophy. From this point onward, I will use the following abbreviations in 
my text: Estetica-E; Conversazioni di estetica-CE; L'estetica di Kant-EK; Veritii e Inter-
pretazione-VI; I problemi dell'estetica-PE. All translations are my own . 
9. See the explication in Rosso. In Croce, on the other hand, thought (or 
thought which is logical, or philosophical) is fundamentally excluded from the 
aesthetic act as pure intuition and expression . See his Aesthetic, ch. one. Similarly, 
in Gertrude Stein, the search is for a rhythmic-expressive language mode which, 
though yet a speaking, is totally devoid of any "content," rational or otherwise 
(where content means or includes the referent). Recall, for example, her Stanzas 
in Meditation. See the discussion in Carravetta 1985. 
10. This aspect, which is revolutionary insofar as it simultaneously opens 
to the "originary" characteristic of all works of art, as well as to its material and 
pragmatic necessity, is also a basic potentiality for action and signification charac-
teristic of all human beings . It comes very close to Polanyi' s heuristic imagination 
and tacit knowing. 
11. As Robert Innis once suggested during a conversation, there are some 
interesting common points between Pareyson's aesthetics and Dewey's Art as 
Experience. 
12. It would be useful here to recall Pareyson' s extensive studies on German 
idealism, in particular his readings of Schiller, Goethe and the late Schelling. 
Cf. also his Conversazioni and the article "Lo stupore della ragione in Schelling," 
in Riconda et al., 137-80. 
13. Vattimo 1986 critiques Pareyson for sympathizing too strongly with the 
"theology" of Kierkegaard and Schelling, jeopardizing the project of seculariza-
tion, as well as for leaving the issue of freedom open enough to mean or imply 
a possible (if not emancipation, at least) reconciliation, which would betray a 
Hegelian strain. In a way, the reservations expressed are directed to Pareyson's 
failure at not bringing his perception of the absence of metaphysical foundation 
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more in line with Heidegger's "ontological difference" and Vattimo's own 
"weakened being," which alone, Vattimo claims (1983), can now permit us to 
ponder whether it is not high time we leave the "question of being" behind. 
14. See in particular Esistenza e persona, 14 et infra. 
15. This passage follows upon the first definition of interpretation we find 
in the Estetica: "interpreting [interpretare] is such a form of knowledge for which, 
on the one hand, receptivity and activity are indistinguishable, and, on the 
other, the known is a form and the knower is a person. Without a doubt inter-
preting is knowing . . . since interpreting is gathering, capturing, grasping, 
penetrating." 
16. Besides Freud and Nietzsche, compare to some of the authors in bibliog-
raphy. In this paper we can only allude to other areas of exploration. 
17. Antonio Banfi's Principi di una teoria della ragione, which discusses in 
great detail neokantianism, came out in 1927. 
18. This allows Pareyson to sidestep simultaneously the issue of the inten-
tional fallacy known to American Neocriticism, as well as the conundrums of 
authorial intention which besieged modern hermeneutics from Schleiermacher 
to Hirsch. Both become irrelevant; cf. E 276-77. 
19. Though Vattimo is also constantly harking back to the more "radical" 
Heidegger-the essay verwindung deals primarily with Heidegger-as well as to 
the Benjamin of the "Theses on the Philosophy of History." 
20. Pareyson has indeed implied that the "quarrel" between philosophy (as 
thinking) and art (as creating) need not be and perhaps is not at all a contradiction, 
an oxymoron, or a reciprocally exclusive dyad of forces where only one in the 
end conceals the Truth. That has been the metaphysical illusion, the technocratic 
desire, the rationalist fallacy, the demise of the Modern Epoch: to believe that 
only philosophy could speak to the truth, that poetry just couldn't be trusted. 
Pareyson certainly speaks favorably to this possible dialogue, and even attempts 
to bridge the chasm between poetry and philosophy: "In the arts there's a diffuse 
distrust of philosophy. They fear that the autonomy of art is compromised and 
that art may disappear. They feel that the cold speculative rigor of philosophy 
contrasts sharply with the emotional shudder of poetry. But this means ignoring 
the character of philosophical thinking. There are in philosophy aspects which, 
if adequately emphasized, make of philosophical meditation genuine and earnest 
poetry, to the point that it becomes impossible to gauge the speculative value 
without accounting for its reality as an art form. The search for and discussion 
about truth, thinking as a personal experience, the liveliness of the imagination 
which underlies philosophical thought: these are so many aspects of philosophy 
which, if rendered evident, can confer upon it an artistic aspect. They might 
even elect to consign reason to the essential [insostituibile, lit. unreplacable] 
expression of poetry rather than to the precise utterances of reason. And then 
there is the movement of the research becoming dramatic reality in Plato's 
dialogues and in Pascal's notes; and there is the personal experience becoming 
absolute identity of art and philosophy in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; and there 
is that same philosophical imagination reinless in the stylistic exuberance of 
Giordano Bruno and Vico's balenare acutezza. Moreover, there's an art of 
philosophizing, a formation-activity intrinsic to philosophy itself: to properly 
exercise it means aiming for the essential expression, the functional aspect of 
reasoning, the coherence of the system. So much so that some speculative rigor 
turns into a literary work, and, in some cases, even a poetic reality .... Finally, 
simply because some romanzi a tesi have failed, we are not authorized to say 
that purpose [la tesi] kills art: in the hands of a great artist thinking [la tesi] 
becomes art, because its very art is a theoretical construct [una tesi]." PE 47-49. 
One cannot but think of Dante as a grand example of this. See also CE 169-79 
on art and philosophy in Schelling. 
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21. Consider the pages on reading in E 219-26, CE 41-48, and PE 189-231. 
22. Compare the pages dedicated to the relationship between truth and 
ideology in Veritii, Part II, 93--187. 
23. This he does in part in his later works, especially the recently published 
Being and Freedom (1986). 
24. I have dealt with this topic at some length in my Prefaces to the Diaphora. 
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